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Abstract  
This paper discusses some of the challenges to 
using formal methods in a certification context and 
describes the effort by the Formal Methods Sub-
group of RTCA SC-205/EUROCAE WG-71 to 
propose guidance to make the use of formal 
methods a recognized approach.  This guidance, 
expected to take the form of a Formal Methods 
Technical Supplement to DO-178C/ED-12C, is 
described, including the activities that are needed 
when using formal methods, new or modified 
objectives with respect to the core DO-178C/ED-12C 
document, and evidence needed for meeting those 
objectives.   
Keywords 
Certification, aeronautics, formal methods 
1. Introduction 
DO-178B/ED-12B, Software Considerations in 
Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification [1], is 
the current basis for software assurance in the civil 
aeronautical domain. Formal methods can be 
applied to many of the development and verification 
activities required for software used in this domain.  
When DO-178B/ED-12B was published in 1992, 
formal methods were briefly mentioned as a possible 
alternative method.  Since that time, advances and 
practical experience have been gained in techniques 
and tools supporting formal methods, to the extent 
that many formal methods have become sufficiently 
mature for routine application on today’s avionics 
products.   
For the past four years, RTCA and EUROCAE have 
sponsored a joint special committee/working group 
(SC-205/WG-71) to update DO-178B/ED-12B to 
take into account and facilitate the appropriate use 
of new software engineering techniques that have 
emerged since 1992. The committee is updating the 
core document DO-178B/ED-12B, and four new 
documents, called technical supplements, are being 
developed to handle specific topics including tool 
qualification, object-oriented approaches, model 
based development, and formal methods. Sub-
groups have been created within the joint committee 
to define these technical supplements. Sub-group 6 
is in charge of formal methods. This paper reports 
on sub-group 6 work and achievements to date 
towards creating a technical supplement for formal 
methods.   
After briefly synthesizing the current content of DO-
178B/ED-12B, this paper first highlights the essential 
characteristics of formal methods, then describes the 
objectives proposed for the Formal Methods 
Technical Supplement (FMTS).  The main goal of 
this supplement is to define how formal methods can 
be used within a DO-178/ED-12 project.  
2. DO-178B / ED-12B 
Developing airborne avionics software in compliance 
with the DO-178B/ED-12B standard is the primary 
means of securing regulatory approval [2]. DO-
178B/ED-12B does not prescribe a specific 
development process, but instead identifies 
important activities and design considerations 
throughout a development process and defines 
objectives for each of these. DO-178B/ED-12B 
distinguishes development processes from “integral” 
processes that are meant to ensure correctness, 
control, and confidence of the software life cycle 
processes and their outputs. The verification process 
is part of the integral processes along with 
configuration management and quality assurance. 
This section gives an overview of the development 
and verification processes, since the use of formal 
methods affects those processes. 
2.1 Development processes 
Four processes are identified as comprising the 
software development processes in DO-178B/ED-
12B: 
• The software requirements process develops 
High Level Requirements (HLR) from the 
outputs of the system process; 
• The software design process develops Low 
Level Requirements (LLR) and Software 
Architecture from the HLR; 
• The software coding process develops source 
code from the software architecture and the 
LLR; 
• The software integration process loads 
executable object code into the target hardware 
for hardware/software integration.  
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Each of these processes is a step towards the actual 
software product. Figure 1 presents the relationships 
among life cycle data items from the development 
processes.  
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Fig. 1. DO-178B/ED-12B development processes 
 
2.2 Verification process 
The results of the four development processes must 
be verified. Detailed objectives are defined for each 
step of the development, with some objectives 
defined on the output of a development process 
itself and some on the compliance of this output to 
the input of the process that produced it. Figure 2 
presents the verification objectives and activities in 
relationship with the development artifacts.  Each 
verification activity is depicted by a dashed arrow 
and the objectives which it satisfies are annotated on 
the arrows. For example, LLR shall be accurate and 
consistent, compatible with the target computer, 
verifiable, conform to requirements standards, and 
they shall ensure algorithm accuracy. On the other 
hand, LLR shall be compliant and traceable to HLR. 
DO-178B/ED-12B identifies reviews, analyses and 
test as means of meeting these verification 
objectives. Reviews provide a qualitative 
assessment of correctness. Analyses provide 
repeatable assessment of correctness. Reviews and 
analyses are used for all the verification objectives 
regarding HLR, LLR, software architecture and 
source code. Test is used to verify that the 
executable object is compliant with LLR and HLR. 
Test is always based on the requirements (functional 
test) and includes normal range and robustness 
cases.  
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Fig. 2. Verification objectives and activities 
 
In addition to these verification objectives in DO-
178B/ED-12B, there are also objectives defined for 
verification of verification; that is, how to be sure the 
software has been sufficiently verified.  The 
verification of verification objectives require that a 
coverage analysis be done. A functional coverage 
analysis is required to ensure that test cases have 
been developed for each requirement. A structural 
coverage analysis is required to ensure that the 
software structure has been sufficiently exercised, 
with different coverage criteria depending on the 
criticality level of the software.   
3. Characteristics of formal methods 
The proposed guidance for the FMTS begins by 
defining what formal methods are from the 
perspective of DO-178B/ED-12B: that is, a formal 
method is a formal analysis carried out on a formal 
model. This perspective is important because it 
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permits discussion of formal methods according to 
the major life cycle processes called out in DO-
178B/ED-12B, especially development and 
verification processes.  Development processes are 
applicable to formal models, and verification 
processes are applicable to formal analyses. 
In general, a model is an abstract representation of a 
given set of aspects of the software that is used for 
analysis, simulation and/or code generation. In a 
certification context, to be formal, a model must have 
an unambiguous, mathematically defined syntax and 
semantics. This makes it possible to use automated 
means to obtain guarantees that the model has 
certain specified properties.  
Although there are important benefits in creating 
formal models of life cycle artifacts, the most 
powerful benefits of formal methods are in the formal 
analysis of those models. Formal analysis can 
provide guarantees or proofs of software properties 
and compliance with requirements. Proof, or 
guarantee, implies that all execution cases are taken 
into account. For the purpose of the FMTS, an 
analysis method can only be regarded as formal 
analysis if its determination of a property is sound. 
Sound analysis means that the method never 
asserts a property to be true when it may not be 
true.  
There are many different kinds of formal analysis, 
but they can typically be classified in three 
categories:  (1) deductive methods, such as theorem 
proving, (2) model checking, and (3) abstract 
interpretation.  
Deductive methods involve mathematical 
arguments, such as mathematical proofs, for 
establishing a specified property of a formal model. 
A correct proof of a property provides rigorous 
evidence of that property for the formal model. 
These proofs are typically constructed using an 
automated or interactive theorem proving system. 
Even with such assistance, constructing proofs can 
be difficult, or impossible in some cases. However, 
once a proof is completed, automatic checking of the 
correctness of that proof is usually trivial. 
Model checking explores all possible behaviors of a 
formal model to determine whether a specified 
property is satisfied. In cases where the property is 
not satisfied, a counter-example is generated 
automatically illustrating where and how the property 
fails to hold. In some cases, a model checker may 
not be able to determine if the given property holds; 
for example, in cases where the complexity of the 
model exceeds the capacity of the model checker.   
Abstract Interpretation is a theory for formally 
constructing conservative representations (i.e. 
enforcing soundness) of the semantics of 
programming languages. In practice, this method is 
used for constructing semantics-based analysis 
algorithms to determine dynamic properties of 
infinite-state programs. With abstract interpretation, 
a formal model is generated, usually within a tool 
that is specific to the particular property under 
analysis. It can be viewed as a partial execution of a 
computer program which determines specific effects 
of the program (e.g., control structure, flow of 
information, stack size, number of clock cycles) 
without actually performing all the calculations. 
4. Development using formal methods 
The development artifacts shown in Figure 1 can be 
specified using a formal model. This is no different, 
in effect, from using any other language to specify a 
development artifact, except that using a formal 
notation allows some of the verification objectives to 
be satisfied by the use of formal analysis.  
Formalizing requirements or design may increase 
the effort required to specify them, compared with 
using more conventional languages, but may result 
in additional errors being found and removed earlier 
during this process due to the additional scrutiny 
inherent in applying a formal notation.   
It is worth noting that not all of the requirements for 
any given development artifact need to be defined 
formally when using a formal method. For those 
requirements which are not formally defined, DO-
178/ED-12 guidance should be used.  
From the perspective of meeting the DO-178B/ED-
12B objectives for development, no special guidance 
is needed when using formal methods. If the 
applicant does not plan to use formal analysis in the 
verification, then there is no need to comply with the 
FMTS. 
In cases where formal analysis is planned, the 
development activities should ensure that there is 
sufficient definition in the formal model to verify 
properties about the artifacts being analyzed. The 
software architecture can be analyzed independently 
of low level requirements. In the same way low level 
requirements can be analyzed independently of high 
level and architectural requirements. Some methods 
create a formal model at the source code level, 
embedding information flow from the design into the 
code, which is then checked by formal analysis. It 
may even be possible to apply formal methods to 
analyze properties of object code. In this case, 
object code is a formal model whose semantics are 
treated the same by the formal analysis as they are 
by the target hardware. 
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5. Verification using formal methods 
With formal analysis, the correctness of life cycle 
data with respect to a formal model or property can 
generally be proved or disproved; therefore, formal 
analysis is able to replace the conventional methods 
of review, analysis, and test, as specified in DO-
178B/ED-12B, for some verification objectives. The 
guidance proposed for the FMTS details the 
potential use of formal methods at each 
development level and gives the conditions for the 
use of a given formal analysis for a given verification 
objective.  
Meeting the DO-178B/ED-12B objectives for 
verification of verification process results is more 
complicated when formal analysis is used. In cases 
where testing alone is used, verification of 
verification is accomplished by a coverage analysis 
to guarantee that software has been tested enough. 
However, test coverage metrics, such as decision 
coverage or modified condition/decision coverage, 
are not meaningful for analyzing the sufficiency of a 
formal analysis.  For the FMTS, an alternative 
approach to coverage is proposed when formal 
analyses are used to replace some testing.  
5.1 Reviews and analyses 
For requirements (HLR and LLR), architecture and 
source code, the use of formal methods is a 
particular case of analysis. Thus the “only” guidance 
needed for formal analysis in these cases is the 
criteria and conditions for the use of formal methods 
for each development process; the objectives have 
not been modified. That is, formal analysis can be 
used to satisfy the objectives for software reviews 
and analysis, as shown in Figure 2, as follows: 
a. Compliance:  If the life cycle data items that 
comprise the inputs and outputs of a software 
development process are formally modeled, then 
formal analysis can be used to verify 
compliance.  Compliance can be demonstrated 
by showing that the output satisfies the input. 
Formal methods cannot show that a derived 
requirement is correctly defined and has a 
reason for existing; this must be achieved by 
review. 
b. Accuracy: Formal notations are precise and 
unambiguous, and can be used to demonstrate 
accuracy of the representation of a life cycle 
data item.   
c. Consistency: Life cycle data items that are 
formally expressed can be checked for 
consistency (the absence of conflicts). If a set of 
formal statements is found to be logically 
inconsistent then the inconsistencies must be 
addressed before any subsequent analysis is 
conducted. 
d. Compatibility with the target computer: Formal 
analysis can be used to detect potential conflicts 
between a formal description of the target 
computer and the life cycle data item. 
e. Verifiability:  Being able to express a 
requirement in the formal notation defined in the 
software verification plan is evidence of 
verifiability in the same way as being able to 
define a test case. In some cases, formal 
analysis is better able to verify a requirement 
then testing.  For example, requirements 
involving “always/never” cannot in general be 
verified by a finite set of test cases, but may be 
verified by formal analysis. 
f. Conformance to standards:  Life cycle data 
items that are formally expressed must be 
compliant with any standards defining the 
formalism. Invalid results will be obtained if ill-
formed requirements are allowed. Since formal 
notations have a well-defined syntax, automated 
syntax checkers are appropriate for verifying that 
the formally stated requirements are well-formed 
with respect to syntax. In addition, an automated 
checker may enforce other restrictions on the 
notation (e.g., complexity of notational 
constructs and other design constructs that 
would not comply with the system safety 
objectives). Automated checking will need to be 
supplemented by review for those standards not 
amenable to automated checking. 
g. Traceability:  Traceability ensures that all input 
requirements have been developed into lower 
level requirements or source code.  Traceability 
from the inputs of a process to its outputs can be 
demonstrated by verifying with a formal analysis 
that the outputs of the process fully satisfy its 
inputs.  Traceability from the outputs of a 
process to its inputs can be demonstrated by 
verifying with a formal analysis that each output 
data item is necessary to satisfy some input data 
item. 
h. Algorithm aspects:  If life cycle data items are 
formally modeled, then algorithmic aspects can 
be checked using formal analysis. 
i. Requirement formalization correctness: If a 
requirement has been translated to a formal 
notation as the basis for using a formal analysis, 
then review or analysis should be used to 
demonstrate that the formal statement is a 
conservative representation of the informal 
requirement. It is important to note that the 
preciseness of formal notations is only an 
advantage when they maintain fidelity to the 
intent of the informal requirement. If the 
semantic gap between an informal statement of 
the requirement and its embodiment in a formal 
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notation is too large, then establishing that the 
formal statement is conservative may be difficult. 
5.2 Test 
Using formal analysis to meet the verification 
objectives for executable object code is the biggest 
challenge for providing guidance because test is the 
only means envisaged in DO-178B/ED-12B for 
meeting those requirements.  Replacing all testing at 
this level by formal analysis is not possible at this 
time; but formal methods can replace test for some 
properties, such as worst case execution time or 
stack usage.  Formal methods can also be used to 
verify the compliance of the executable object code 
with respect to high level or low level requirements. 
However, testing will always remain mandatory and 
will be the primary means for verification of the 
executable object code.  
Because formal methods cannot replace all testing, 
verification objectives for executable object code are 
the same when using formal methods as for test in 
DO-178B/ED-12B. However, an additional objective, 
as follows, is needed when formal analysis is used 
to verify properties of the executable object code: 
• Analysis of property preservation between 
source code and object code. For the formal 
analysis of source code to be used as 
verification evidence for the target system, 
verification should be performed to establish 
property preservation between source and 
object code. By verifying the correctness of the 
translation of source to object code, formal 
analysis performed at the source code level 
against high or low level requirements can be 
used to infer correctness of the object code 
against high or low level requirements. This is 
similar to the way that coverage metrics gained 
from source code can be used to establish the 
adequacy of tests to verify the target system.  
This allows for alternative verification paths for the 
executable object code, as shown in Figure 3. For 
example, compliance of object code to LLR can be 
demonstrated using formal analysis on source code 
and analysis of property preservation between 
source code and object code.  
 
5.3 Verification of verification 
Coverage analysis in DO-178B/ED-12B is defined in 
two steps: 
- requirements-based coverage analysis, to 
ensure that test cases exist for each 
requirement; 
- structural coverage analysis, to ensure that the 
code structure has been sufficiently exercised by 
test cases.  
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Fig 3. Alternative verification paths 
Requirements-based coverage analysis can be done 
directly when using formal methods by showing that 
formal analysis cases exist for each requirement. 
Structural coverage however is a notion strongly 
connected with test and execution of code. To be 
able to define an alternative to structural coverage 
analysis, the objectives of structural coverage 
analysis have to be examined. These objectives, as 
given in DO-178B/ED-12B, are to detect: 
- shortcomings in requirements-based cases or 
procedures, 
- inadequacies in software requirements, 
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- dead or deactivated code. 
When a code structure is not covered by some test 
cases, then either some test cases are missing for a 
given requirement, a requirement is missing, or the 
code structure is dead or deactivated. 
When using formal methods, verification is 
exhaustive, so a requirement that has been verified 
formally has been completely covered. However, 
there is no guarantee that a requirement has not 
been forgotten. Thus, it is necessary to have a 
means to ensure the completeness of the set of 
requirements. Similarly, it is necessary to have a 
means to ensure that there is no unidentified dead or 
deactivated code.   
Consequently, the solution proposed to provide 
coverage when using formal analysis at the 
executable object code level is meet the following 
set of fours objectives: 
Complete Coverage of Each Requirement 
The most thorough verification would be where all 
possible paths through the code with all possible 
data values are considered. Formal methods ensure 
this but sometimes the formal analysis requires 
assumptions to be made about the software system. 
All such assumptions should be verified. 
Completeness of the Set of Requirements 
Where requirements are formally modeled, it should 
be demonstrated that the set of requirements is 
complete with respect to the intended functions. That 
is:  
• For all input conditions the required output has 
been specified.  
• For all outputs the required input conditions have 
been specified. 
If the set of requirements is found to be incomplete 
then additional requirements (generally not derived 
requirements) should be added. If a demonstration 
of completeness cannot be achieved, then structural 
coverage analysis must be used. 
Detection of Unintended Dataflow Relationships 
Verifying that the information flow in the source code 
complies with the requirements ensures that there 
are no unintended dependencies between the inputs 
and outputs of the code. If unintended dependencies 
exist then these must be resolved either by adding 
the missing requirements (generally not derived 
requirements) or removing the erroneous code. 
Detection of Dead Code and Deactivated Code 
Guidance for dead and deactivated code is not 
different when using formal analysis from using test.  
In both cases, dead and deactivated code should be 
identified by review or analysis and dealt with as per 
the guidance in DO-178B/ED-12B. 
6. Specific objectives 
Previous sections have addressed how formal 
methods can satisfy the objectives currently defined 
in DO-178B/ED-12B. The proposed guidance for the 
FMTS also includes some additional objectives 
concerning the formal methods that are used.  
When formal analysis is used to meet the verification 
objectives of DO-178/ED-12, the formal method 
should be correctly defined and justified as follows: 
a.   All notations used for formal analysis should be 
verified to have precise, unambiguous, 
mathematically defined syntax and semantics; 
i.e., they are formal notations. 
b.   The soundness of each formal analysis method 
should be justified. A sound method never 
asserts that a property is true when it may not be 
true.  
c. All assumptions related to each formal analysis 
should be described and justified (e.g., those 
associated with the target computer; those about 
the data range limits; etc.). 
The first objective requires demonstration that the 
method used is formal. The second one restricts the 
use of formal methods to sound methods. (Not all 
formal methods are sound.)  The last one focuses on 
assumptions because assumptions are often used 
by formal analyses and it is important for the 
correction of the analysis that they are all justified.  
7. Benefits of using formal methods 
Formal methods were developed as a branch of 
computer science in order to reason more 
scientifically about software. Initially the advantages 
of formal methods were in analyzing the behavior of 
source code to understand where this was incorrect. 
Since those early applications of this approach in the 
1970’s, the problem of error prone source code has 
reduced and instead most of the errors in software 
development are now generally accepted as being 
attributable to requirement errors. 
It has become apparent that creating formal 
representations or models of requirements can help 
to address this problem in the same way as it did 
with source code. In that respect, formal methods 
have the potential for both increasing safety and 
decreasing the cost of certifying flight-critical 
systems. Specific benefits include improving 
requirements, reducing error introduction, improving 
error detection, and reducing cost.  Secondly, the 
formality of the description allows us to carry out 
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rigorous analyses. Such analyses can verify useful 
properties such as consistency, deadlock-freedom, 
satisfaction of high level requirements, or 
correctness of a proposed design. 
7.1 Improve Requirements 
Experience shows that the act of capturing 
requirements using formal notations is of benefit: it 
forces the writer to ask questions that would 
otherwise be postponed until coding. Using a formal 
notation to capture requirements provides a simple 
validation check, as it forces a level of explicitness 
far beyond that needed for informal representations. 
Requirements expressed in a formal notation can 
also be analyzed early to detect inconsistency and 
incompleteness and therefore remove errors that 
would normally not be found until later in the 
development process. 
7.2 Reduce Error Introduction 
Writing high or low level requirements formally 
improves the quality of the development artifacts. 
Formalized requirements prevent misunderstandings 
that lead to error introduction. As development 
proceeds, compliance can be continually checked 
using a formal analysis to ensure that errors have 
not been introduced. 
A further advantage of using formal methods at the 
requirements level is the ability to derive or refine 
from these requirements the code itself, thus 
ensuring that no errors are introduced at this stage. 
Alternatively their use at the requirements level 
allows formal analysis to establish correctness 
between requirements and code. 
7.3  Improve Error Detection 
Formal analysis can provide exhaustive verification 
at whatever levels it is applied: high level 
requirements, low level requirements, source code 
or executable. Exhaustive verification means that all 
of the structure is verified over all possible inputs 
and states. This can detect errors that would be 
difficult or impossible to find using only a test based 
approach. 
7.4 Reduce Cost 
In general, software errors are less expensive to 
correct the earlier in the development lifecycle they 
are detected.  The effort required to generate formal 
models is generally more than offset by the early 
identification of errors.  That is, when  formal 
methods are used early in the lifecycle, they can 
reduce the overall cost of the project. When 
requirements have been formalized the costs of 
downstream activities are reduced. Formal notations 
also reduce cost by enabling the automation of 
verification activities. 
8. Conclusion 
A primary motivation for developing guidance for 
using formal methods in a certification context was 
to better enable the routine use of mature formal 
methods.  That guidance, as proposed to date in a 
FMTS to DO-178/ED-12, allows adoption of formal 
methods into an established set of processes for 
development and verification of an avionics system 
to be an evolutionary refinement rather than an 
abrupt change of methodology. Formal methods 
might be used in a very selective manner to partially 
address a small set of objectives, or might be the 
primary source of evidence for the satisfaction of 
many of the objectives concerned with development 
and verification. 
This paper has presented a synthesis of the effort of 
the Formal Methods Sub-group of RTCA SC-
205/EUROCAE WG-71 in developing guidance for 
using formal methods in these ways in a certification 
context with DO-178/ED-12.  
Ongoing work in the formal methods sub-group 
concerns a discussion paper that is intended to give 
several examples of the use of formal methods.  
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